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Russia muddled through macroeconomic stabilization after late 1993 when a massive amount of 
credit issue by the Russian central bank stopped and interest rates turned positive. A process-oriented 
explanation ascribes the lowered inflation rates to the introduction of government bonds that yield 
incredibly high returns. It makes large commercial banks take an anti-inflationary position. Instead of 
solely emphasizing the elite’s strategic choices however, in this article I will look at what political 
circumstances make these choices available and effective. I associate the macroeconomic stabilization 
with political opportunity structure for rent-seekers and their collective action dilemma. In this 
discussion, the 1993 constitutional crisis and subsequent party polarization are emphasized. I also 
argue that privatized state institutions deprive rent-seekers of the ability to take collective actions as 
time goes. 
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1. PROCESS OF MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN RUSSIA 
 
State autonomy theory argues that macroeconomic stabilization requires a strong state 
insulated from interest groups (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Strong interest groups and the 
weak state defined Russia throughout the Yeltsin period. Therefore, according to the state 
autonomy theory, it is quite puzzling that Russia continued to lower inflation rates after the 
early high inflation rates due to the so-called “shock without therapy.”   
Treisman (1998) provides an interesting explanation for this puzzling success of Russian 
macroeconomic stabilization. He maintains that macroeconomic stabilization in Russia was 
peculiarly achieved through letting powerful bankers buy state securities whose returns were 
set artificially high. According to him, providing economic rents in a different form made the 
Russian bankers change their preference from being in favor of inflation to being opposed to 
it. Furthermore, the possibility of political opposition from the Russian enterprises who 
critically depended upon soft-credits for their survival was preempted by building arrears 
with the energy sector.  
This interesting explanation, however, does not ask why Russian rent-seekers gave up 
their previous rights and methods that made more money in exchange for selective incentives 
that were less lucrative overall. Simply speaking, the Russian industries would have been 
better off if they had received cheap credits rather than free fuels.  
In the year 1995, the Russian economy showed a remarkably low inflation rate compared 
to the previous years. So, with regard to Russia’s macroeconomic stabilization, the year of 
1995 has been focused upon by Triesman and others.  
However, if we instead examine inflation rates in Russia for this period on a monthly 
basis, a rather different picture emerges. Once we trace the trend of monthly CPI, a 
significant change in macroeconomic stabilization becomes apparent from the last months of 
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1993 and the first months of 1994. Around this period, there was a notable turn in the 
government’s monetary policy to correct the loose monetary management that was directly 
responsible for hyperinflation in Russia. Indeed, the central cause of Russian hyperinflation 
was cheap credits to factories recording losses, mediated through commercial banks. 
Discounting rate of the Central Bank of Russia in November 1993 rose sharply. The “ex post 
real discount rate” turned positive in August 1993 before the real interest rate plunged to the 
negative, to as much as –70 to –80 percent a year. Easterly and Vieria da Cunha (1994) agree 
that 1993 was the turning point of Russia’s monetary policy. As a result, the monthly rates of 
increase of the monetary supply declined from 32% in September to 6% in November 
(Gaidar 1995: 48). Gaidar (1995: 49) actually notes that “by November [1993] there was no 
longer a strong pro-inflation coalition.” After November 1993, the significantly positive 
difference of the CBR discount rate from the inflation rate continued to be maintained (Blasi 
1997: 133). 
This study argues that the year 1993 is the turning point for Russia’s macroeconomic 
stabilization. It is in late 1993 that inflation started to drop, as the government’s monetary 
policy was increasingly tightened (Gustafson 1999: 90; OECD 1995: 37). This means that 
we need to investigate the variables that encouraged the tightening of monetary policy other 
than GKO bonds, to explain Russia’s macro-economic stabilization.  
In spite of these important changes in late 1993 and early 1994, as Treisman (1998) 
argues, recurring high inflation rates in the middle of April 1994 indicated that the 
government submitted to pressures from rent-seekers. This time, however, the main rent-
seekers were regional governments and the agricultural sector. In fact, after 1993, we did not 
see any notable challenge from the so-called “red directors” and financiers who benefited 
most from the hyper-inflation.   
Thus, in order to explain why this change took place and how the government had the 
ability to implement strict monetary policies at this time and under the given circumstances, I 
propose two hypotheses, based on the concept of the privatized state. Given my empirical 
evaluation of Russia’s macroeconomic stabilization, I propose the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Political Opportunity Hypothesis: Reforms are unlikely to be initiated in the 
presence of a strong opponent who has the potential to recruit a large number of powerful 
rent-seekers into his/her political camp. Hypothesis 2. Collective Action Dilemma 
Hypothesis: A privatized state becomes more able to reform its economy as time goes on 
because collective action of rent-seekers becomes weaker and weaker in the privatized state.  
In order to place these hypotheses in the proper context, it is necessary to first explicate 
what I mean by ‘privatized state’. Following Evans (1998), I measure the state in terms of 
corporate coherence and rule-governed behaviors among state organs and their agents. Here, 
a privatized state is defined as “the lack of the ability to prevent individual incumbents from 
pursuing their own goals (Evans 1998: 12).” Here, the privatization of the state not only 
means its lack of insulation from private parties, but more importantly, it implies that the 
outcome of state institutionalization is hardly differentiated from private spheres, so no 
serious collective norms or values lead to a patterned behavior of state agents different from 
those of civilians.
 1
 The absence of shared objectives, the priority of personal interests over 
collective goals, the personal appropriation of public offices, the prevalence of agency 
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opportunism, and unrestrained corruption are characteristics of the privatized state. In this 





1. FIRST HYPOTHESIS: Political Opportunity Structure for Rent-Seekers and 
Reform  
 
Hypothesis: Reforms are unlikely to be initiated in the presence of a strong opponent who has 
the potential to recruit a large number of powerful rent-seekers into his/her political camp. 
 
Political opportunity structure refers to the viable alternatives open to actors, in this case, 
the political alternative for rent-seekers to replace the reform-minded incumbent. Therefore, 
what is important here is how strongly rent-seekers are tempted to defect from their 
previously winning coalition. If there is a strong and attractive alternative for rent-seekers, 
the incumbent, afraid of their defection, will choose not to implement tightened monetary 
policies.  
Two conditions should be met in order that a challenger may induce oligarchs to defect. 
First, the probability that a challenger will beat the incumbent should be great. Second, the 
main political support of the strong challenger should consist of a small faction of society, 
but one that includes a winning coalition of rent-seekers. In this situation, the reduction of 
rents is very likely to lead to the defection of rent-seekers to another political camp because 
defection is politically safe and economically profitable. Therefore, reforms are unlikely to 
be initiated in the presence of a strong opponent that has the potential to co-opt a large 
number of important rent-seekers into his/her political camp. 
On the other hand, if a strong challenger relies for his power base on the population at 
large and does not win the loyalty of politically strong rent-seekers, this means that the size 
of the winning coalition becomes large and economic rent significantly diminishes for 
individual rent-seekers. In this case, there is no strong incentive for rent-seekers to join the 
challenger even though an incumbent chooses to reform. In fact, that ordinary people are 
politically activated by a challenger means that the degree of democracy is enhanced. This 
may strengthen the incentives for a leader to improve the economy.  
We can find a similar argument from North (1981: 28). North argues that a ruler has two 
constraints; “a competitive constraint and a transaction constraint.” Here, the competitive 
constraint means that a ruler should consider the rivals that strive to replace him. When 
politically significant constituents have access to alternatives, a ruler will not disturb their 
property rights, especially their rights for economic rent so as not to lose their political 
support. 
This all implies that with respect to the provision of private goods (economic rents), 
political opportunity structure affects the relative bargaining power of the ruler with 
politically important constituents. Note that there is another factor that affects the bargaining 
power; collective action among rent-seekers which will be discussed later. The bargaining 
power constrains a ruler’s policy choice and it determines the amount of rent for a significant 
constituent (Levy 1988: 10-2).    
In this article, three factors are raised that affect the political opportunity structure of rent 
seekers; constitutional order, cleavage structure among interest groups, and party 
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competition structure. First, in the area of constitutional order a power-sharing arrangement 
is particularly relevant to political opportunity structure. A constitutional grant of veto power 
or a significant decision-making power over multiple groups or institutions would increase 
political power of rent-seekers who are willing to take a side among multiple constitutional 
power centers. In the context of post-soviet Russia, semi-presidentialism before the 1993 
Constitutional crisis
2
 is an example. 
Internal cleavages among rent-seekers are another factor of political opportunity structure. 
Suppose that there are two different strong factions in the economic elites  one occupies 
the industries of tradable goods, and the other engages in the businesses of non-tradable 
goods. In this situation, the reform of exchange rates might asymmetrically favor one side.  
When this happens, the betrayed party will defect from the dominant coalition to seek 
another political alternative, if one is available. This actually explains why the Russian 
government did not initiate loans for shares
3
 to co-opt financial interest earlier. 
When there are significant subgroups in the oligarchy whose interests are different from 
one another and political importance grants them veto power, reform attempts might be adrift. 
In particular, in the case where their interests are largely divergent, compromise would be 
difficult and their contention would resemble a war of attrition (Alesina 1994) to impose the 
costs of reform on the losing side. In this game, a ruler is unlikely to make a decisive action 
because his partisan decision would lose political support from a group of important 
constituents especially when there is a viable alternative. On the other hand, when subgroups 
lose their veto power cleavage structure becomes irrelevant to the politics of reform. 
Cleavage structure in the economic elites, in other words, works through factors that 
determine political importance of subgroups. This discussion leads us to examine the conflict 
between financial and industrial capital in Russia.   
The structure of party competition is the third important factor that shapes the political 
opportunity structure of rent-seekers. The discussion of the political opportunity structure of 
rent-seekers leads to a new perspective on polarization in post-communist societies. When 
there is significant polarization between an incumbent and a challenging party, and when this 
broadens the policy distance between rent-seekers and the challenging party, the latter is less 
likely to be a political alternative for them. Therefore, a leader who is less fearful of the 
defection of rent-seekers may initiate reform to hurt more or fewer of their interests.  
On the other hand, if there is a strong contending party near the policy position of the 
incumbent, the policymaker could not reduce the provision of private goods for his powerful 
constituents. At least a strong centrist might be threatening to the reform-minded incumbent. 
Here, the polarization of party politics might contribute to the improvement of a ruler’s 
bargaining power by weakening centrist parties. Russia’s macroeconomic stabilization will 
be examined around these three factors. 
 
2.2. SECOND HYPOTHESIS: The Collective Action Dilemma of Rent-Seekers and 
the Dynamics of State Autonomy
4
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Hypothesis: A privatized state becomes more politically able to reform its economy as time 
goes on because the potential for collective action of rent-seekers becomes weaker and weaker 
under a privatized state.  
 
This study argues that the privatized state weakens society and makes it unable to form 
strong collective action. It makes three propositions to explain the social consequences of the 
privatized state. First, a privatized state is likely to strengthen the concern for relative gains 
in society, which in turn frustrates the cooperation that might otherwise be easily realized. 
Second, a privatized state is likely to make it hard for players to enjoy a long-term time 
horizon and to hinder cooperation. Third, a privatized state encourages social groupings 
based upon a narrow but strong group boundary and produces a fragmented and parochial 
society. This makes it disadvantageous for extensive reciprocity to spread trustworthiness 
and “norms of generalized reciprocity.” Therefore, extensive cooperation with outsiders is 
unlikely to happen. In short, a privatized state, causing the intensification of concern for 
relative gains, a shortened time horizon, and disconnected social groupings, decreases the 
possibility of social cooperation.  
All of this means that the collective action of rent-seekers becomes weaker and weaker 
under the privatized state. This has a significant implication for reform politics. As time goes 
on, a privatized state will become more able to reform distorted economies than before, not 
because it is insulated from social pressures, but because the vested interests cannot take 
collective actions effectively.  
A privatized state is likely to increase the centrality of relative gains because it increases 
zero-sum conflicts in society. Such a state is very willing and able to transfer public 
resources to a private party whenever a minimum amount of material incentive attracts the 
agency’s opportunism. The distribution of wealth and power through the private occupation 
of public domains resembles a zero-sum game, which means that one’s gain is another’s loss. 
Therefore, a privatized state vulnerable to parochial demand is more likely to increase the 
probability that the public is involved in a zero-sum game, everything being equal. As zero-
sum situations become more frequent, the sensitivity to relative gains gets stronger. As 
Snidal (1991) convincingly demonstrates, as the pressure of relative gains increases, social 
interactions become non-cooperative.  
Not only does a privatized state create an environment to transform cooperative 
interaction into a non-cooperative game, but it also undermines the possibility of conditional 
cooperation in an iterated non-cooperative game (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). A privatized 
state shortens the time-horizons and makes reciprocity unreliable, which in turn makes 
collective action for the public goods less likely to happen, since the widespread private 
occupation of the public domain creates a strong positional power. Positional power is 
generated when actors place themselves in certain strategic positions. Whoever has 
positional power is able to define terms and conditions unilaterally over others. We have to 
keep in mind that a privatized state maintains the unwavering ability to create exclusive 
private rights for public resources, since it is closely related to the personal interests of state 
agents. Institutionalized particularism in a privatized state makes it easy for individual 
bureaucrats to construct various entrance barriers that favor their clients. In short, positional 
power is easily and frequently created in a privatized state. The easy and frequent appearance 
of positional power makes a reciprocal strategy useless and greatly shortens time horizons. 
When a defector has strong positional power, utilizing a significant difference in payoffs 
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between unilateral cooperation and defection, it will not be feasible for the defected to punish 
the defector because the defector will dictate terms and change the rules for the next 
encounter. Under such a circumstance it will be self-destructive to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy, 
to be nice in the first move and to maintain a long-term time horizon.  In conclusion, a 
privatized state eliminates the two conditions for conditional cooperation; the feasibility of 
reciprocity and a long term time horizon because an initial defection produces a great amount 
of positional power. 
A privatized state also discourages institutionalization and the creation of strong and 
extensive reciprocity. Gowa (1988) argues that intensive interest group formation is highly 
associated with the degree of “publicness” of political goods. For example, if state 
institutions allow the enactment of trade policies aiming at specific products, the low 
publicness of the political outcomes helps social actors that share narrow selective incentives 
to facilitate the strong collective action of small groups. A privatized state is likely to issue 
quasi-private political decisions to target a small number of clients. Also, the prevalence of 
agency opportunism makes a modicum of organizational resources in the private sector 
enough to obtain the personal favors of state officials. Therefore, under a privatized state 
vertically segmented social institutionalization is likely to occur, which hinders the practice 
of extensive reciprocity. 
 
 
3. THE POLITICS OF MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN RUSSIA 
 
Until Yeltsin decided to resolve political tensions with parliamentary leaders through the 
bombardment of the White House, Yeltsin’s main strategy was to solicit support from the 
political forces of industrial managers who politically maneuvered between him and 
parliamentary competitors. This political choice was directly responsible for high inflation 
rates in 1992 and 1993. I argue that Yeltsin’s political economic choices were forced because 
of the political opportunity structure formed by semi-presidentialism and the coalition 
structure of political forces and industrialists who were able to fully utilize this political 
opportunity.  
Right after the collapse of the USSR there were still no significant political groups to 
challenge the organizational power of industrialists from the old communist party (Mcfaul 
1995). It is very obvious that social groups other than institutions related to the communist 
party were poorly developed throughout the Soviet period. The demolition of civil society 
for more than seven decades accounts for the fact that there were no other interest groups 
competing against industrial managers. Financial capital that later fiercely competed with the 
industrial sector had just begun to form thanks to the hyperinflation. As such, in the 
beginning of the hyperinflation the main interest group was industrial mangers. The cleavage 
between financial and industrial capital began to appear as the hyperinflation progressed and 
the financial sector earned a huge sum of windfall from a simple operation of soft credits. 
The organizational power of industrialists was politically realized in the absence of a 
strong polarization that would force factory managers to fling to one side. Before 1993, there 
was no serious party polarization to tear off the centrists. To make them politically available, 
factory managers firmly stationed themselves in the center under the banner of the Civic 






 between Yeltsin and his challengers. Ambivalent towards competing power 
contenders, they were willing to choose either the left forces including NSF, or the reform 
government to maximize their interests.  
Had he abandoned the centrists in the middle of the deepening legislative-executive 
conflicts, Yeltsin might have jeopardized his political power. In fact, Yeltsin’s political 
maneuvering showed a very strong centralizing tendency in 1992 and 1993, and political 
challenge from the Congress made Yeltsin move even further toward the side of the factory 
managers (Yeltsin 1994:168-9). In early 1992, Yeltsin decisively changed his economic 
policy to appeal to factory managers. Yeltsin started his policy change by removing his first 
deputy, Gennday Burbulis, who was a symbol of liberal forces in Yeltsin’s regime, in April 
1992. Above all, the removal of Lopukin, Gaidar’s minister of oil, symbolized Yeltsin’s 
policy distance from Gaidar and his reform team. It was only after Gaidar’s bold movement 
to propose the resignation of his whole ministry that he succeeded in intimidating the 
Congress. Yeltsin made peace with the centrists in the Congress by removing Lopukin and 
replacing him with Viktor Chernomydin, who was strongly supported by the Civic Union, 
and was later named prime minister in December 1992.  
As the conflict between the parliament and the executive escalated, Yeltsin strengthened 
political ties with Volsky, who was a former member of the CPSU Central Committee and a 
leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), as well as the Civic 
Union. Yeltsin’s efforts directly reflected the political necessity that he felt to maintain 
power. According to Shumeiko, Yeltsin thought that the political forces backing the Civic 
Union were more important for his political power than any other forces, such as Democratic 
Russia, the nationalists, or the communists (Reddaway and Glinski 2001).  
Here, I want to call attention to the constitutional opportunities that were open to factory 
managers and their banks. Semi-presidentialism, which poorly delineated relationships 
between the legislative and executive branches, institutionally created a strong political 
challenge that might have had a real chance to win the leadership. Such political and 
institutional circumstances forced Yeltsin’s choices, as expressed in an article in Izvestiia, 
titled “Yeltsin Concludes and Alliance with Civic Union” (Hough 2001: 144). 
In the deepening legislative-executive conflicts, Volsky, the founder of the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, behaved in such a way as the hypothesis expects. 
After April 1992, he appeared to have a significant political influence over policy-making in 
the government. After initially associating himself with Khasbulatov to issue an amended 
version of the government plan that demanded 1.2 trillion rubles, Volsky cut a deal with 
Yeltsin behind the scenes. In this deal the issue of 200 billion rubles was promised, as well as 
the recruitment of the so-called “red directors” into the government, as noted earlier (Lohr 
1993: 823). 
Yeltsin made a further concession in monetary policy and issued 500 billion rubles in the 
summer of 1992. And the new head of the Central Bank of Russia accelerated this process. 
Then soft credits became widely available for the industrial sector, in particular, for the 
virtually bankrupt state firms. Thanks to Gerashchenko, state firms recording losses 
eliminated their massive debts easily. He issued soft credits reaching over a trillion rubles 
from June to mid-September in 1992 (Lohr 1993: 824).  
These extreme rent-provisions, however, started to change as the legislative-executive 
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conflict headed into a crisis, and Yeltsin became determined to implement constitutional 
change. In mid 1993, when there happened to be conflicts mounting to a deadlock between 
the President, Government, Parliament and the central bank, Yeltsin gave a television 
address on 20 March in which he announced a vote of confidence in his performance to be 
held the following month. Although there were no serious grounds to suspect foul play and 
vote fixing, a surprising 60% backed Yeltsin, and 53% backed the reform movement. On the 
basis of this, Yeltsin felt a bit more freedom to back the reformers that remained in the 
government, such as Anatoly Chubais, the deputy prime minister for privatization, and Boris 
Federov, the new finance minister, over the conservatives brought in by Chenromyrdin. 
The crisis came to a head in mid-September, when Parliament began debates, stripping 
Yeltsin of his powers, and also tabled motions for a budget that would have dramatically 
increased social spending, and with it, hyperinflation. Yeltsin launched a preliminary strike 
and dissolved the Parliament on September 21, resulting in a hostile confrontation that was 
resolved violently, in Yeltsin’s favor on 3-4 October. He then announced an election for a 
new Parliament and a referendum on a new constitution to be held on December 12. Yelstin 
once again returned his favor to the reformists, and he appointed Gaidar as First Deputy 
Prime Minister for economics, who quickly drew up a continuing program of liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization and various structural changes. Meanwhile, those closer to 
Yeltsin’s inner circle began drafting a Constitution proposal that would institutionalize the 
President’s recent political gains. 
The introduction of the new 1993 Constitution and the move from semi-presidentialism 
to super-presidentialism greatly affected the political opportunity structure of rent-seekers. 
The new Constitution of 1993 completely amended the earlier form of semi-presidentialism, 
which was characterized by significantly circumvented presidential power, and considerable 
sharing of political power with the Congress of People’s Deputies (Huskey 1999). Before the 
change, parliamentary leaders enjoyed a very secure institutional base. The new Constitution 
of 1993 gave Yeltsin political power that was virtually free of accountability to the Congress.  
Indeed, the earlier semi-presidentialism institutionally created a strong political challenge 
from the Parliament that attracted Russian rent-seekers. This changed completely after the 
1993 constitutional crisis. After the virtual removal of Yeltsin’s accountability to the 
parliament, there was no institutional basis for the “war of attrition” to extract more rents 
(Alesina 1994). This is the reason why we can see the temporal coincidence of a tightened 
monetary policy and constitutional change. The newly approved Constitution institutionally 
eliminated a political alternative for rent-seekers.  
Political polarization was another factor that changed the political opportunity structure 
of factory managers and commercial bankers. After the 1993 election, when the Civic Union 
and also the parties of the liberal reformists had suffered humiliating defeats, the Russian 
party competition became more and more polarized in the sense that there was no longer a 
significant central party, and Zuganov’s Communist Party (CPRF) made a notable advance 
in the Duma. The CPRF platform clearly expressed the objection to market reform and 
endorsed the necessity of recovering state ownership. This meant that the CPRF was not such 
a reliable alternative for the pragmatic red directors as the Civic Union had been.   
This change made it easy for Yeltsin to control and reduce the amount of rents. As 
mentioned earlier, the most significant change that affected factory managers the most was 
the considerable reduction of soft credits issued by the Central Bank. Ironically, this tight 
monetary policy was led by Viktor Gerashchenko, who became notorious among Western 
economists for his lavish credit supply in 1992. In the meantime, with this tight monetary 




policy, overall subsidies to enterprises also dropped rapidly. Overall, it is estimated that the 
amount of the total rents, which peaked in mid 1992, continued to decrease (Aslund and 
Dmitriev 1999).   
 
 
4. DIMINISHING COLLECTIVE ACTION ABILITY AMONG RENT-SEEKERS AND 
THE PROCESS OF MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION 
 
The mechanism of the hyperinflation in 1992-1993 created another powerful interest 
group along with traditionally strong industrial managers; bankers in Moscow. The bankers 
earned a huge sum of windfall from the operation of soft credits issued by the Central Bank 
of Russia (Johnson 2000). This newly rising powerful interest group had a strong reason to 
sustain high inflation rates, as well as the industrial managers. The government with a weak 
state autonomy could not fight off both of the powerful interest groups at the same time in 
order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. The government needed to wait for the time 
when either one became weak enough to acquiesce in bad deals. 
After the bankers joined the politics of macroeconomic stabilization, Russia’s 
macroeconomic stabilization process was associated with the dynamics of balance of power 
between financial and industrial capital. In 1994, the balance of power shifted to favor 
financial over industrial capital. Taking advantage of this change, the government stopped 
issuing soft credits to the factory managers that were the main cause of the hyperinflation in 
1992-1993. Then, the government revoked the privileges of financial oligarchs and 
consolidated macroeconomic stabilization without further concessions in 1997.  
Together with the deteriorating political opportunity structure for factory managers after 
1993, their weakened collective action power provided the government with room to 
maneuver. During the heyday of the hyperinflation, the government could not impose costs 
for macroeconomic stabilization on either side because both were capable of imposing a 
credible threat on the government. Along with the dramatic change of the constitutional 
order and party polarization, diminishing collective action ability within and among interest 
groups allowed the government to escape the trap of “war of attrition” at the cost of factory 
managers. The following examines how interest groups under the privatized state lost their 
collective action power. The story begins with Russia’s privatization. 
Russia’s privatization process really proves the importance of relative gains and 
positional power under the privatized state that weaken collective action ability of interest 
groups. Financial capitalists earned significant relative gains over industrial managers in the 
beginning of market transition. They then transformed their relative gains into positional 
power and became the biggest winners in a “winner takes all” economy. The financial 
capitalists, initially well-positioned to distribute soft credits, strengthened their political 
position through their initial relative gains. After this, they obtained almost every important 
piece of state property through the loans-for-shares auction.  
According to my theoretical expectation, Russian industrialists and financial oligarchs are 
in general very likely to lose their ability to take collective action because of their relative 
closeness to the privatized state. During the heyday of privatization they were thus very 
susceptible to relative gains and positional power competition because of their high 
accessibility to rent-seeking opportunities in the privatized state.  
Between these two powerful interest groups, Russian industrialists were the first victims 
to significantly lose the ability for collective action because of the privatized state. This was 
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indirectly observed when the red directors lost their factories to the Russian financiers in the 
loans-for-shares scheme. More direct evidence is found in the dissolution of the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). Even within the single industrial sector, 
industrialists failed to make themselves into a strong interest group. The only exception was 
the gas sector because there was only one company in the whole sector: Gazprom (Lepekhin 
1995, 71). 
Collective action of factory managers once evinced a formidable power. At the time 
when the State Property Committee (GKI) led by Chubais, set a privatization plan to create 
outside ownership in very early 1992, factory managers collectively objected to the plan and 
drew a big concession from the government; they forced the government to abandon its 
original plan to convert state-owned industries to open joint stock companies (Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1995: 3-81). 
However, the strength of the collective action of the factory managers, originally strong 
enough to create de jure property rights of state-owned factories, rapidly dwindled after they 
succeeded in securing their rights. As discussed earlier, they then sought individualized deals 
with the government to enrich secured property rights (Cooks and Gimpleson 1995). 
Indeed, survey research finds that there was a significant behavioral change among 
Russian industrialists between 1992 and 1993. Kharkhordin and Gerber (1994), surveying 
industrialists in St Petersburg in 1993, find that the boundary of the exchange of “mutual 
help” shrunk to include just an “essential few.” A survey conducted a year ago reports that 
industrialists were prepared for cooperation with more than the “essential few.”    
Industrialists’ diminishing collective action ability because of competition for more 
relative gains from the privatized state helped the government to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization. The logic of the war of attrition suggests that if two important factions are in 
power parity, macroeconomic stabilization will be postponed because these factions, unable 
to incur any cost to each other, would tend to maintain the status quo (Alesina 1994). As 
soon as factory managers lost their collective action power after their creation of insider 
ownership and the 1993 constitutional amendment deteriorated the political opportunity 
structure of the managers, the power parity was broken and the government achieved 
macroeconomic stabilization at their expense. It stopped issuing soft credits to them. As a 
result, they experienced a serious liquidity problem, and inter-enterprise arrears and wage 
arrears were soaring (Woodruff 1999). Yet easy money for factory managers disappeared 
with no voices heard. 
In contrast to factory managers that had to be satisfied with free energy instead of free 
money, huge windfall profits coming from the GKO bonds market
6
 and the loans-for-shares 
that compensated bankers for their loss of free money were waiting for them. As a result of 
these, bankers (or “oligarchs,”
7
 as they became known in the press) dominated the economy, 
and they appeared able to perpetuate the redistribution game of economic wealth by further 
privatizing the Russian state at the cost of the whole population. 
Soon after the financial oligarchs successfully drew the compensations from the 
government however, they lost their collective ability because of their relentless myopic 
pursuit of relative gains. This completely eliminated the possibility to force the central bank 
                                                          
6 It refers to federal state treasury bills whose returning rates were more than 200 percent in 1995 when 
the annual inflation rate was below 25 percent. 
7 It refers to a group of bankers who owned Russian industrial jewels such as oil and gas and wielded a 
great amount of political influence. 




to issue another round of soft credits in the future. Otherwise, they might have demanded 
some free money to revive high inflation rates when the government made fiscal reforms to 
end easy money for them. As soon as they defeated the industrialists successfully and no 
challenging forces were near them, they started to fight each other to gain more than the 
other oligarchs. The growing intensity of internal conflicts among them culminated to the 
“bankers’ war” in 1997, which had a devastating effect on the collective action ability of the 
financial oligarchs.  
In 1995, at the beginning of the notorious loans-for-shares scheme that gave financiers 
huge economic favors, one of the leading financiers, Oneximbank head Vladimir Potanin, 
achieved quite considerable cooperation among the oligarchs in defeating the industrialists. 
Freeland (2000: 174) reports that Nevzlin, a partner of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, another 
leading financier and the head of Menatep Bank and Yukos Oil, said that “we [oligarchs] 
reached an agreement of who would take what. We agreed not to get in each others’ way.” 
As later became known, in the first round of the loans-for-shares scheme in 1995, the 
agreement was well respected, and each financier waited to take its turn as promised. Potanin 
was given free reign to single-handedly overcome the resistance of the factory manager of 
Norilsk Nickel; Khodorkovsky got Yukos oil without competition.  
In the first round of the loans-for-shares, as oligarchs agreed, they cooperated 
successfully to steal very lucrative state properties from the red directors. This was a definite 
victory of the Russian financiers over the moribund industrialists. Their successful 
coordination continued to be practiced even after Berezovsky’s Sibneft claimed its share. 
The power of cooperation among the oligarchs was demonstrated once again in the ability of 
the oligarchs to join forces to ensure the re-election of Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential 
election. 
Potential conflicts based on concerns for relative gains began to appear as soon as 
Potanin was given the position of first deputy minister for finance and he developed a strong 
tie with Anatoly Chubais. This political tie challenged the bankers’ arrangement. As soon as 
Potanin enjoyed strong positional power in the privatized state, he and his Oneximbank 
group claimed their right to participate in the auction of a 25% stake in Svyazinvest, a new 
telecommunication firm formed from the Soviet telecommunications infrastructure, and the 
biggest privatization chunk to date, in July 1997. The problem was that Potanin was playing 
out of turn, and his defection in the cooperation game that he himself set up allowed him to 
capture the Svyazinvest tender at an uncompetitive rate. 
This incident led to the bankers’ war. Berezovsky and Gusinsky, the communication 
moguls, used their television networks and newspapers to charge the “young reformers” of 
corruption. Chubais counterattacked Berezovsky to earn his resignation from the Security 
Council. This battle went on for moths under Yeltsin’s wavering leadership. 
In fact, this embarrassing tug-of-war made the government decide on policies 
disadvantageous for the powerful bankers. In July 1997, Yeltsin signed a decree that there 
would be no more privatization of state property like loans-for-shares (McFaul 2001: 253). 
Another important decision facilitated by the loss of collective action of bankers was to 
liberalize the GKO bond market. The returning rates of GKO bonds in 1997 decreased 
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This government decision to liberalize the market indicates that the large banks failed to 
secure their big source of profit. They became another victim who experienced collective 
action dilemma because of the privatized state. Their weak collective action ability actually 
explains why macroeconomic stabilization was not endangered even after the GKO bond 
market closed, which was tantamount to the disappearance of the most important selective 
incentive to “co-opt” the large banks for macroeconomic stabilization, according to Schleifer 





In fact, a theory of “war of attrition” explains a significant part of the process of Russia’s 
macroeconomic stabilization. According to the logic of the war of attrition, inflation is 
continued until there is a political solution to the question of who pays the costs for 
stabilization. In the Russian waiting game, the industrial managers were the first to lose their 
political power because of the constitutional change and the deepening polarization in party 
politics. It was not only that their political opportunity worked against them, but they also 
lost the ability for collective action in the middle of the privatization process. Since losing 
this ability, they never recovered it because of the constant shifts in property redistribution, 
thanks to the privatized state.  
After this, factory managers received what they deserved. The amount of rent is a 
function of the political power of rent-seekers. Given their weak political power, factory 
managers had to be satisfied with free fuel and tax arrears to compensate for their loss of soft 
credits. Financiers enjoyed high interest rates on GKO bonds at their expense in the low-
inflation economy from 1995 to 1998.  
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